

**Society – Technology – People****Theory-Interviews on the relationship between societal and technological change.*****Interview with Prof. Dr. Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen***

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**1 Where do we find sources for technological change and social division of labour?**

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3 The old “social shaping of technology” formula dates back to the 1980’s. It states that  
4 technological developments are to some extent driven by social conditions and this was  
5 one of the perspectives adopted in Germany. This was followed by so-called technology  
6 genesis research and development, i.e. social conditions in the most general sense of  
7 the term. These may be assigned to the level of society itself, to organisations and their  
8 structures or to the individual level, but where they occur is actually secondary.  
9 Technological development, societal development, and the factors which in turn affect  
10 technological development operate in a kind of feedback process. Technological  
11 development generates societal structural conditions in the form of institutionalisation  
12 processes. In specific terms, new bodies of knowledge are created, for example even to  
13 produce curricula for engineer and technician training. In the broadest sense, in the  
14 wake of the development of a new technology, a new coordinated area of action  
15 emerges for stakeholders who, to put it crudely, previously had very little to do with one  
16 another. Behind all of this is the old and in my view ancient basic sociological question of  
17 how coordinated action between heterogeneous stakeholders and heterogeneous  
18 interests actually comes about. The crucial mechanism in certain areas and under  
19 certain conditions, although not always, may be technological development. Certain  
20 heterogeneous stakeholders agree on a certain technological objective, towards which  
21 they orient themselves. The resultant cooperation development and actions then  
22 become established, or institutionalised, so to speak. In the broadest sense, this would  
23 be a general perspective of technological development in connection with societal  
24 conditions. Scientific research and the stakeholders that operate in this area and, of  
25 course, push forward potential development or use of new technologies, thus constitute  
26 a driver in this regard. The case of artificial intelligence is really a good example. AI has  
27 developed from a somewhat symbol-oriented methodology to neuronal networks. As far  
28 as I understand it, this is a completely different type of logic which is what permits a leap  
29 to be made towards learning systems and the like in the first place. This happens fully

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30 unquestioningly within the laboratory. A central role is played by the coordination  
31 processes I mentioned earlier and by processes of institutionalisation. Innovation and  
32 technology research include famous laboratory studies, which describe in detail how  
33 agreement and coordination processes work. That is one aspect. But the question of  
34 whether what is created experimentally in the laboratory actually becomes reality  
35 requires further thought. Here we also have to consider socio-theoretical structure and  
36 also action-based connections. There are massive structural changes regarding the  
37 ability to innovate in nearly every country, this is described as the emergence of “big  
38 science” in innovation studies. Usually, regarding the USA, this is dated to the 1940s, an  
39 accelerating process of massive scientification of technology development. This is not  
40 just the emergence of universities, but also of research institutes, funded public and  
41 sometimes also private, aiming at systematic development of technology. I believe,  
42 however, that scientification and indeed “big science” as the real thrust behind this  
43 institutionalisation process would have to be dated to the middle of the 20th century. Of  
44 course, we are currently in a situation where this is playing a key part in a highly  
45 differentiated science and research system under the label of “digitalisation”.  
46 Internationally, this is very differently pronounced and has various key focuses.  
47 #00:05:12-3#

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### Who is driving technological change and social division of labour?

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52 This affects the phases which essentially relate to broad dissemination, i.e. whether a  
53 technological development or innovative technology is accepted or deployed. It also  
54 affects the specific phase of implementation of introduction to users. And this now brings  
55 us to the companies which, for example, make use of new production technologies. On  
56 an action level this certainly involves conditions affecting decision making processes of  
57 users. Naturally there are restricting conditions, conditions of economical rationality for  
58 example, determining whether certain technologies are usable or not for a company and  
59 at what cost. I also believe that this constitutes a considerable flaw in the most recent  
60 debate surrounding digitalisation. There are complementarities here between the  
61 potential of a technology and the conditions relating to its use. Although from a  
62 completely different area, one example in my view is the development and marketing of  
63 the smart phone. The iPhone of eight or ten years ago was a perfect match for the social  
64 habits of communication. People were already used to thinking in Internet categories. I  
65 think that this is a key condition at the diffusion level. The thing I have constantly  
66 encountered whilst investigating various cases is what we would term to be “follow-up  
67 costs” which are incurred, for example, when a company installs three new robots on an  
68 assembly line. Employee and management representatives are crucial stakeholders  
69 who, of course, play a massive role at the application and implementation level in a firm.  
70 And then there is the societal level, which represents more of a meso level. The Industry  
71 4.0 Platform is one example here. The influence of the IG Metall trade union—and we  
72 are currently on IG Metall premises—naturally plays a major role. Things are different in  
73 other countries, where the part played by unions in this regard is very subordinate. In  
74 these cases, the employer associations and major firms are to the fore. So, as we have  
75 said, everything is a negotiation process at some point. If we take a precise look at the  
76 current situation in respect of actual innovation processes, a shift is taking place within

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77 the innovation system. This is certainly happening in Germany, but is occurring  
78 internationally, too. If I now relate this to production technology development, then the  
79 tradition in Germany was that the innovation system was governed by stakeholder  
80 groups. Development was determined by a situation that was mainly aligned to the  
81 conventional engineering sciences in conjunction with machine construction and  
82 electrical engineering. In other words, this was a system which was application oriented  
83 rather than being particularly technology intensive or high tech. The situation is now  
84 completely different. Suddenly, computer science and information technology have  
85 arrived on the scene. Under this label, Industry 4.0 is providing the main thrust for new  
86 opportunities that are now technologically available, and it is in their interest to bring  
87 about further changes to this system. #00:08:57-3#

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### 90 **Which consequences will arise from technological change?**

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92 This is an exciting topic, which we discuss under the label of human-machine-  
93 interaction. I think that it will form a continuous thread over the coming years, especially  
94 given the development of autonomous systems and of systems that are based on  
95 artificial intelligence. On the other hand, ongoing automation and the role humans play  
96 in automated plants are an old issue in the sociology of work. How are humans and  
97 human work actions linked to the technical system? In terms of the development, I would  
98 say that the first thing to happen is an increasing decoupling of human and automated  
99 work actions, or the process which is technologically driven. Secondly, such a  
100 decoupling implies that many work tasks are replaced and taken over. This is not only  
101 implied by this automation perspective, something which is not new, it also suggests an  
102 autonomisation perspective which will see the assumption of tasks which are not  
103 structured in a routine way and also of decision making opportunities. This means that  
104 humans will continue to retreat. Initially there seems to be less work and substitution will  
105 take place. But the third point is that we will then have the phenomenon of a dramatic  
106 shift in the “scope” of work actions. A technologically driven dynamic will take effect on  
107 the work process. This will provide us with completely new possibilities and necessities  
108 for the structuring of work with which we may not be at all familiar yet. We will have new  
109 coordination and planning functions which actually did not exist before. In principle,  
110 these will be able to mark out an area which can then be used for new forms of work. So  
111 the first and general thesis is that work will not disappear. The second thesis would be  
112 that work can be redesigned and that completely new perspectives can be opened up.  
113 Of course, and this is not something which I have addressed, the whole question of  
114 decisions of autonomous systems on the one hand and of human work processes on the  
115 other depends on ethical questions which remain to be discussed. I did not really want to  
116 get into that. There can be virtually no talk of a causal and deterministic correlation here.  
117 We can only revisit the old categories already mentioned. We have innovation, diffusion  
118 processes and implementation processes. In implementation, i.e. the decision as to how  
119 new technologies are used and applied, social consequences in the widest sense of the  
120 term will ultimately be determined. You can ask, at an aggregated level, and this is a

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121 discussion which is now omnipresent, how many job losses will occur if we introduce  
122 robots, and what will be the consequences of digitalisation on the labour market.  
123 Actually, these are estimates of potential, in any case, the sorts of highly prominent  
124 study results that are going around the globe and providing a constant source of  
125 annoyance because of their lack of methodological rigour, and as in my view, they are  
126 not sufficiently valid empirically. Things become more complicated if we attempt to use  
127 all scenarios and methods as a basis for the analysis and postulation of different  
128 development tendencies and perspectives. A whole mass of existing structural  
129 conditions is then at play, and statements then naturally become more vague and less  
130 certain. “What direction are we heading in?” It is easy to see that the stark answer is  
131 couched in terms of “versus”. “Versus technology terminism.” We must not make this  
132 mistake. Firstly, we are speaking of a scenario which we simply call substitution or  
133 automation. This reflects a common argument within current mainstream debate that the  
134 introduction of new technologies will lead to the loss of a whole series of jobs, at least in  
135 the short term. If we follow the debate and some of our empirical findings, this will mainly  
136 affect simple routine tasks although by no means all such tasks. The fact that by no  
137 means all such tasks are affected is a very important point. We thus have a situation in  
138 which jobs will be lost in the short term whilst some jobs will remain. But I would  
139 continue with this scenario. The “common wisdom” of historically oriented labour market  
140 research tells us that technology thrusts always set off something like compensation  
141 measures with regard to job losses. This means that, in the case of the successful  
142 introduction of new technologies, new jobs will be created in the long or medium term,  
143 given a series of marginal conditions, which will then compensate for job losses to a  
144 certain extent at the macro or aggregated level. That would be one thing. The second  
145 scenario is referred to as “upgrading”. This also somewhat reflects the normative or  
146 optimistic perspective, mainly the Industry 4.0 debate, which works on this assumption.  
147 We can also cite Kagermann, who says that we have not simply operators but we have  
148 regulators, controllers, warranty workers, experts and so forth. This scenario thus  
149 implies that repetitive simple tasks will disappear. On the other hand, new systems,  
150 information and training opportunities and the better synoptic view that will be acquired  
151 via such systems will facilitate a general upgrading of all jobs. A third scenario, which we  
152 refer to as polarisation, is a relatively prominent theme on the labour market at an  
153 aggregated or macro level, especially with regard to income and qualifications  
154 structures. We tend to relate this to the operational level to some extent, and we at least  
155 believe that we are able to find some evidence of it in various activity areas in different  
156 employment segments. Maintenance activities are a classic example. These are  
157 demanding tasks in many regards, but are taken apart in the wake of new planning and  
158 formalisation methods. Polarisation then means that certain tasks are upgraded and  
159 become more challenging, some tasks are automated, and others are downgraded from  
160 the medium level; this opens up a chasm. The question is whether this will be a long-  
161 term tendency. This has been referred to by colleagues in England as “lousy and lovely  
162 jobs”, i.e. what is left over at the end. This would be the third scenario. The fourth  
163 scenario cuts across the three already named and perhaps affects more or less

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164 everyone. In overall terms, this can be designated as flexibilisation and delimitation, in  
165 other words “working in the cloud”. Delimitation or flexibilisation thus means an erosion  
166 of organisational structures, of time regulation and of localities where work is carried out.  
167 With regard to internal operations, there is empirical evidence that this leads to project  
168 groups, temporary jobs, a kind of dissolution of organisational structures and to the  
169 debate with which you are familiar—inter-company development tendencies, platforms  
170 and work chains controlled across firms. The end result can be very precarious jobs in  
171 the form of “crowd workers” or solo self-employed persons and a different outcome with  
172 regard to demanding tasks. I think that we are living in a societal formation or system  
173 which is no longer conceivable in any way without technological development. And so I  
174 arrive at the design perspective. This is an argument within the Industry 4.0 debate. New  
175 intelligent systems are in a position to minimise and make more effective use of  
176 resources and so forth. Surely there is a lot to this but I would say it is not yet being used  
177 enough. This would be a question of regulation. Politics are in demand here. There is  
178 talk about machine responsibility, which would need to be defined, but the assumption is  
179 that these autonomous systems possess something that resembles their own  
180 responsibility. I am not very firm in philosophical action theory, but I am convinced that  
181 the notion of responsibility also needs to be linked with norms to some extent, with the  
182 allocation of action and responsibility which cannot be ascribed to these new  
183 technological systems in such a way. The problem arises, of course, when decisions are  
184 taken in a way that is isolated from the systems. The consequences are then not  
185 foreseeable, and the processes via which a system arrives at a certain decision are  
186 completely non-transparent. There is also a lack of transparency with regard to what is  
187 learned from the process by the systems and how a different decision might be taken  
188 next time. How can mobility be handled in the future? Society is becoming increasingly  
189 mobile, and this is an objective which it continues to pursue. But the consequences are  
190 all side effects which are difficult to calculate and may get on society’s proverbial bad  
191 side at some point. They could be seen as bringing a massive need for regulation in  
192 their wake. Yes, this is a central issue. New technologies may somehow once again  
193 bring about a shift in the current international division of labour, possibly a reintegration  
194 and perhaps reversal of past globalisation processes. Branch structures will also shift.  
195 Functions and occupational profiles may change or be expanded. This is a point which  
196 we also encountered yesterday. How will occupational profiles change? There are  
197 currently two conflicting positions. The first, to which I am also inclined, is a conservative  
198 and moderate position which I believe has its origins at BIBB. This argument involves  
199 pursuing the upgrading of certain tasks and occupations and the updating of  
200 occupational profiles etc. as what is presently happening. Others say that focusing on  
201 occupations is no longer of any use. We need to think in terms of competences. If  
202 people understand what they mean by this, we no longer need task-specific stocks of  
203 knowledge. It is merely necessary to have skills and the ability to deal with various  
204 action requirements. This is a completely different perspective. And it brings all kinds of  
205 social and labour market policy consequences in its wake. Tendencies towards shifts

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206 and erosion are doubtlessly included in these considerations and are bound to play a  
207 part in this regard. #00:20:51-9#

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### 211 **How are drivers and consequences of technological change connected?**

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213 As far as diffusion is concerned, i.e. the dissemination of certain technologies amongst a  
214 wide variety of user groups and application areas, I believe that there is an important  
215 functional argument, somewhat historically abridged and allowing for criticism. How  
216 should I put it? Complementarities or elective affinities between the preferences, needs  
217 and bottlenecks that are certainly in place must exist between users on one side and the  
218 opportunities afforded by the new technology on the other. I think this argument is  
219 absolutely central. There are many arguments that play a role in various areas—price,  
220 functionality and knowledge with regard to what needs to be present collectively. This is  
221 one thing. Mechanisms at the direct user, micro or action level are a second crucial  
222 factor. These decision making processes have been an object of discussion for some  
223 considerable time and are of current interest with regard to new technologies. We refer  
224 to them as introductory processes. Introductory processes thus have a role to play.  
225 Firstly, there are the decision making processes undertaken by the key stakeholders in  
226 an organisation or company. Secondly, political negotiation processes also occur at this  
227 organisational level. These involve different actors from within management or from  
228 different management factions who are convinced to varying degrees of the respective  
229 merits of certain technologies. Thirdly, of course, we have the labour policy  
230 constellations that are specifically relevant in Germany. What role is played by the works  
231 council? What role is played by the trade unions? Does management seek conflict? Or  
232 does it attempt to avoid confrontation by taking a step backwards? What resources do  
233 the decision makers have at their disposal? Are they in it for the long or short haul? Do  
234 they have a supervisor breathing down their necks and asking for a progress report  
235 every two months? What knowledge do they have? And what degree of scope are the  
236 decision makers accorded by the company within the constraints of everyday business?  
237 The counter argument at some point will be that if they form part of a larger value-added  
238 chain, sooner or later they will come under pressure and will need to introduce new  
239 systems and be able to perform tasks such as data transfer. This may possibly put them  
240 in a difficult situation. My supposition would be that these processes involving elements  
241 and mechanisms that are effective here and which tend to have to be formulated in  
242 micro policy analytical terms have essentially remained the same. These new  
243 networking technologies however, form an additional argument and supplementary  
244 thesis—i.e. if digitalisation and Industry 4.0 are conceived in terms of the characteristics  
245 of “big data”, networking and intelligent systems. The crucial stakeholders are thus now  
246 confronted with new challenges. They require new knowledge and new action  
247 capacities. They need to arrive at a point where they are able to assess the net effect of  
248 such far reaching decisions on the deployment of new technologies, especially with  
249 regard to networking and the use of data. This alters the question as to whether this can  
250 still be managed in everyday processes. In this case, therefore, there is also an  
251 academisation of key stakeholders and decision makers. Various examples in specific

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252 historic situations have shown that there is always a development boost, although we  
253 also need to accept that incremental innovations are the norm in engineering  
254 development, both economically and technologically. Further development thus takes  
255 place on an incremental step-by-step basis. The first thesis was already formulated  
256 above. It assumes different social consequences of new technologies in the most  
257 general meaning of the term and of various development pathways rather than  
258 postulating technology terminism. We do not have any “one best way” for the use of  
259 technology, i.e. if someone were to come along today and say that the new autonomous  
260 systems require in particular a form of work organisation which constitutes an upgrading.  
261 This brings me to the second thesis, which is that the use or rather the introduction, the  
262 specific design, the form of use and the organisational usage of the new technologies is  
263 a structural object, a decision making object. We had this before—a micro political  
264 decision making process which has the introduction of new technologies as its object.  
265 The same can, however, of course be related to the laboratory studies mentioned right  
266 at the outset. These tend to act via invention and innovation processes, and social  
267 negotiation processes and decisions ultimately play a huge role. This would, in some  
268 measure, be the second point. And it is a relatively important one. The third thesis or  
269 hypothesis which I will formulate is something which I feel is accorded far too little  
270 attention in the current debate. There are, of course, barriers, limits and inhibitions to the  
271 effectiveness, viability and usefulness of new technologies. These need to be looked at  
272 carefully in order to on the other hand be able to weigh up the social policy  
273 consequences properly. #00:26:41-7#

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### 276 **What measures can be taken to steer technological change?**

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278 Following the discussion in various academic and public groups and circles and reading  
279 many publications one might be left with the impression of an autonomous technological  
280 development, a sort of technology push which is driving forward societal development.  
281 To couch things in overcritical and pointed terms, indeed to speak polemically, it may be  
282 said that for many of those involved, technology is something which simply appears from  
283 nowhere. Particularly if we pursue the debate in connection with the newer and current  
284 discussion centring on the fresh areas of potential offered by artificial intelligence, the  
285 impression conveyed is that the boost now expected with regard to the possible  
286 applications of artificial intelligence systems in the widest sense has its roots in new  
287 growing areas of technological potential, the increasing effectiveness of computer  
288 systems, the fact that such systems have become massively cheaper, networking and  
289 other similar processes, “big data”, the possible areas of use of “big data” methods and  
290 so forth. However, virtually no questions are posed with regard to where the interests,  
291 stakeholders and certain factors which brought about this indisputable technology boost  
292 and set it in motion actually lie. I believe that the development of artificial intelligence can  
293 serve as an empirical and historical example for the conducting of a number of  
294 systematic and highly interesting analyses. The topic of artificial intelligence actually  
295 goes back to the 1940's. Acting from within this domain in particular, it has consistently  
296 formulated major promises and then gone on to topple the ensuing hype, if indeed hype  
297 occurred. In the field of innovation research, there is a concept with which we have  
298 already worked in some cases within the context of the aforementioned micro system

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299 technology analysis. This is called “promising technology”, defined by certain key  
300 stakeholders as an “expectation statement”. This enters the discussion or specialist  
301 debate at some point and then acts as a mechanism or catalyst towards which a wide  
302 range of participants move and by which their actions, objectives and “expectations” are  
303 then guided. Market processes and future visions are also very strongly influenced by  
304 expectations, and this plays a massive role in technology and technological  
305 development at the level on which I am now focusing. “Industry 4.0” is a classic  
306 example. On the one hand, this is a vision which is difficult to grasp. On the other, it  
307 brings an inherent promise of modernisation which, again to speak crudely, is not easy  
308 for any reasonable company manager to shake off. So, from my point of view at this  
309 structural level, I would collate two developments that arrive from different directions.  
310 One of these is the economic structural level previously mentioned and only vaguely  
311 outlined. This exists in the fields of business and industry and consists, for example, of  
312 the relationship between opportunities for rationalisation and the flexibility requirements  
313 of the market. At the time, therefore, the market and the production economy were the  
314 categories on the one side. On the other side, the economic conditions included the  
315 possibility of accessing or using certain areas of technological potential and then drive  
316 forward and implement technological development. If we are speaking of technological  
317 development, we must sometimes follow the old political economist Joseph Schumpeter,  
318 a name which is frequently forgotten, by differentiating between its various phases. For  
319 one thing, there are invention and innovation. Inventors and innovators are always to be  
320 found somewhere. They may comprise a single person sitting in a small room or involve  
321 the systematic development of a robot system. This is however not yet linked with any  
322 kind of statement regarding how and if this system can be diffused and secondly  
323 regarding how such a system is to be implemented and used in specific application  
324 contexts. Schumpeter established a banal yet fundamental principle. The fact that we  
325 have developed innovation oriented to the market does not provide any indication as to  
326 how this process will be realised. Diffusion is the central category in this context.  
327 Considerations regarding diffusion mechanisms which are more theoretically oriented  
328 can be conflated with considerations technology and innovation research, where the  
329 factors I have outlined above progress to certain path-dependent processes and to the  
330 use and further development of technology. This then exerts a reciprocal effect on  
331 structural conditions. The supporting factors at the level of invention or laboratories are  
332 bound to be different in general terms to those found at the application level. The  
333 development or innovation level is naturally dependent on structural conditions within the  
334 scientific system. It relies on available knowledge, on the funding opportunities that are  
335 in place in the given scientific research system. Structural conditions are once again at  
336 play. Major international comparative studies on innovation processes have been carried  
337 out. These have produced clear and convincing outcomes. Innovation systems, or what  
338 we would today call the ecosystem or innovation ecosystem are opened up and  
339 supported or inhibited by various structural constellations and different innovation  
340 perspectives. But the argument in response to your question was that, in respect of the  
341 factors which foster innovation processes, we need to start by taking a precise look at  
342 the structural environment, i.e. the structure of the respective innovation system. There  
343 is a reason why innovation research has been speaking about different national  
344 innovation systems for some considerable time, particularly in international comparative  
345 terms. I would say that the nature of the laboratories is determined by the conditions and

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346 structures of such an innovation system and the constellations of stakeholders and  
347 funding opportunities. The question is what traditions etc. are in place. These and  
348 innovation culture, to introduce a concept that is difficult to define, force development in  
349 certain directions. So I would speak of path dependencies rather than of inhibitions and  
350 barriers. This is an important point which we are currently facing. Is this disruption or  
351 not? Is technology driving change so quickly that massive structural shifts are taking  
352 place? But such structural changes are very difficult to find in technology development  
353 historically. Schumpeter would say that there are creative entrepreneurs who jump off  
354 the trodden path and somehow bring about destructive change, but that they are rare.  
355 On the one hand, we have areas of potential, artificial intelligence and autonomous  
356 decision making systems. On the other hand, we need to speak of barriers. However, it  
357 may even be possible to classify these barriers to a certain extent. One simple example  
358 could be termed functional barriers. This is the famous “Polanyi’s Paradox”, which is  
359 constantly stressed in literature and for which empirical evidence is constantly found.  
360 The crux of the paradox is that we know more than we can tell. The classic example  
361 would be: “Can you explain how you learned to ride a bicycle?” Neither you nor I can do  
362 so. To put it in a different way, until today reaching for something in a cluttered box is  
363 obviously very difficult for a robot – no matter how intelligent. But such an act does not  
364 constitute any problem at all for you and for us. So there are functional limits to  
365 intelligent systems. They cannot be deployed everywhere. A robotics expert with whom I  
366 am well acquainted once formulated this as follows: “We have systems that can run on a  
367 smooth surface. As soon as there are cobblestones, they fall over”. The thesis is that  
368 these functional limits are naturally extended by technological development and  
369 innovation but that new barriers may emerge as the result of complexity. This is the first  
370 set of barriers. The second set, as we mentioned before, can simply be termed as the  
371 economic decision making process oriented barriers to implementation. Every head of  
372 production will ask the following straightforward questions: “Of what benefit is it to me?  
373 What will it cost? What sort of consequences will I have to deal with?” This does not  
374 mean that such systems are implemented via a rectilinear procedure. Thirdly, general  
375 political perspectives also naturally play a role. How are such systems legitimised or  
376 evaluated normatively in the societal debate in the first place?